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HE ROMAN CA'l'HOl.dC WELPARB CORPORATION 
UF SAN l'1HA:·:CISCO 
CITY OI'' PIEDMONT 
v. 
of Ordinances.-
in and not 
,1 ··stiJ!n hle exercise of 
[2] !d.-Zoning-Legislative Disf::etion and Court 
favor of the of the exercise of polict> 
diil'cr from the determination 
is a 
has substantial relation to the pul: · :c morals or 
the meas:;re will be deemed to be 
of the police power. 
[3] Schools-Parents-Rights.--Parents have the to send 
their children to private schools, rather than public ones, which 
are located in their mmwdiate or gerwral neigllhorhood. 
[~a, 4b] :Municipal Corporations-Zoning-Subjects of Regulation 
-Schools.--An ordinance is invalid which exclude~ private 
schools from an area in which public schools are not excluded. 
a private school not being inimical to the public welfare in 
the absence of any showing of exceptional circumstances con-
cerning the pnrticular location of such school. 
[5] Schools-Private Schools.-A private school is not free from 
control as distinguished from the control exercised over public 
schools (see Ed. Code, ~ that a private school 
shall be taught in English and shall offer instruction in the 
branches of study required in public schools), and a city, 
under its police power, can insure the preservation of the 
public peace and of private property. 
[6] Id.-Parents-Rights.-'l'he state's interest in public education 
docs not empower the Legislature to school children to 
receive instruction from public teachers only, since it would 
thereby take away the right of parents to dirPct the upbringing 
and educntion of ehildr{'n under thPir control. 
PHOC.BEDING in mandamus to compel the issuance of a 
building permit. Writ granted. 
[1] See Cal.Jur., Municipal Corporations, § 158 et seq.; Am.Jur., 
Zoning, § 14 et seq. 
McK. Dig. References: [1] Municipal Corpol'ations, ~ 144; [2] 
Municipnl Corporations,§ 145; [3, 6j Schools,§ 108; l4J Municipal 
Corporations, § 159; [ 5 J Schools, § 8. 
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CARTER, J.-This is a proceeding in mandamus by peti-
tioner, the Roman Catholic \V elfare Corporation of San 
Francisco, to compel the issuance of a building permit for 
the construction of a building· to be used for an elementary 
school in which secular and religious subjects were to be 
taught. 'l'he building permit was denied on the sole ground 
that a zoning ordinance of the city of Piedmont prohibited 
the construction of any school within Zone A, where peti-
tioner's land is located, except public schools under the juris-
diction of the board of education of the city of Piedmont. 
In Zone A, there are three elementary schools, one junior 
high school and one high school, all under the jurisdiction 
of the board of education of the city. The ordinance in ques-
tion was passed by the city council and approved by a large 
majority of the voters at a general election. 
There is only one question involved: Whether the city of 
Piedmont may, by ordinance, constitutionally prevent the 
construction of a building to be used for private school pur-
poses in an area where public schools are located. 
[1] "It is well settled that zoning ordinances, when rea-
sonable in object and not arbitrary in operation, constitute 
a justifiable exercise of police power, . . . [2] Every in-
tendment is in favor of the validity of the exercise of police 
power, and, even though a court might differ from the deter-
mination of the legislative body, if there is a reasonable basis 
for the belief that the establishment of a strictly residential 
district has substantial relation to the public health, safety, 
morals or general welfare, the zoning measure will be deemed 
to be within the purview of the police power.'' (Wilkins v. 
City of San Bernardino, 29 Cal.2d 332, 337 [171 P.2d 542].) 
We must then determine whether, in the instant case, there 
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is a reasonable basiil for the ordinance 
schools in an area where public schools are permitted. Peti-
tioner acquired its property subsequent to the time the ordi-
nance was passed. It is conceded that the question is one 
of first impression in this state. 
The record shows that Zone A is of 98.7 per cent 
of the entire area of the city of Piedmont and is populated 
approximately 98.2 per cent of the entire of 
the of Piedmont. Zone B has .59 per cent of the area 
of the city and consists of three parcels of 
land none of which is unimproved; Zone C has .24 per cent 
of tlw area of the city and consists of 10 noncontiguous 
parcels of land none of 'vhich is unimproved; Zone D has 
.46 per cent of the total area of the city and cm.tsists of five 
noncontiguous parcels of land two of which are unimproved. 
Private schools are permitted in Zones B. C, and D. The 
land owned by petitioner and on which it is contemplated 
the private school in question will be constructed is imme-
diately adjacent to Corpus Christi (Homan Catholic) Church. 
Petitioner argues that the ordinance in question is uncon-
stitutional and void because of its arbitrary and unreason-
able discrimination against private schools. Respondrnts, on 
the other hand, argue that the ordinance constitutes a reason-
able exercise of tlJe city's police power in that the city is 
primarily residential in character, that in excluding private 
schools, the city council could consider such factors as the 
character of the district, the conservation of property values, 
public opinion, matters affecting traffic control, size of streets, 
parking, noise, fire protection, overburdening of water mains 
and sewers, and the peace, comfort and quiet of the district. 
It is contended that private schools may be located in the 
three remaining zones; that the proposed school would be 
attended by children from both Oaldand (the adjacent city) 
and Piedmont and perhaps children from other communities 
while the public schools in the zone would be attended by 
only Piedmont children and that the larger number of children 
would bring about more noise and traffic hazards with the 
necessity for more traffic control. Respondents rely on State 
v. Sinar, 267 Wis. 91 [65 N.W.2d 43, 47], a mandamus action 
by a private, nonprofit corporation to compel the city building 
inspector to issue a permit for the construction of a private 
high school in a class ''A'' residential zone where public 
schools were permitted. It was there held, with two justices 
dissenting, that ''. . . tangible differences material to the 
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which sustain the 
the schools. 'ro 
of 'private.' The 
serve different 
ent. 
stand on 
C.2d 
out 
between 
the antithesis 
They 
The 
ing ordinances,-the and morals, 
as laid down section 62.23 (7) and developed 
by respondent's brief. we may not say that the two schools 
differ. But when we come to 'the promotion of the general 
welfare of th<· there's the rub.' The pub-
lic school has the same features objectionable to the surround-
ing area as a private one, but it has. also, a virtue which the 
other lacks, namely, that it is located to serve and does serve 
that area without discrimination. Whether the private school 
is sectarian or commercial, it now complains of dis-
crimination, in its services it discriminates and the public 
school does not. Anyone in the district of fit ag·e and educa-
tional qualifications may attend the pnblic high school. It 
is his right. He has no comparable rig·ht to attend a private 
school. To go tl1ere he must meet additional standards over 
which the public neither has nor should have control. The 
private school imposes on the all the disadvantages 
of the public school but does not compensate the community 
in the same manner or to the same extent. If the private 
school does not make the same contribution to public welfare 
this difference may be taken into consideration by the legis-
lative body in its ordinance. If education offered 
by a school to the residents of an area without discrimination 
is considered by the eouncil to compensate for the admitted 
drawbacks to its presence there, that school may be permitted 
a location ;vhich is denied to another school which does not 
match the and we cannot say that such a distinction 
is arbitrary or unreasonable or that such discrimination be-
tween the tvw schools lacks foundation in a difference which 
bears a 'fair, substantial, reasonable and just relation' to 
the promotion of the general welfare of the community, which 
is the statutory purpose of zoning laws in general and of 
the ordinance in question." The dissenting opinion pointed 
1955] RoMAN CATIT. ETc. CoRP. v. CrTY OF PrEmroxT ~12D 
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out that the primary purpose of all schools was to educate 
the students ; that the state was interested in having educated 
c·hildren to the end that they eventually become good citizens; 
that private schools as well as public ones promote the general 
welfare and that there was no substantial difference in the 
purpose which they served. 'l'he dissenting opinion quoted 
from the case of Catholic Bishop Chicago v. Kingery, 371 
Ill. 257 [20 N.E.2d 583, 584], where it was said: "We fail 
to perceive to what degree a catholie school of this type will 
be more detrimental or dangerous to the public health than 
a public school. It is not pointed out to us just how the 
pupils in attendance at the parochial school are any more 
likely to jeopardize the public safety than the public sehool 
pupils. Nor can we arbitrarily conclude that the prospective 
students of the new school will seriously undermine the gen-
eral welfare. As a matter of fact such a school, conducted 
in aecordance with the educational requirements established 
by State educational authorities, is promotive of the general 
welfare." 
Petitioner argues that parents have the basic constitutional 
right to have their children educated in schools of their own 
choice, subject to reasonable regulations as to subjects re-
quired to be taught, manner of instruction, etc. In Pierce v. 
Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534 [ 45 S.Ct. 571, 69 L.Ed. 
1070, 39 A.L.R. 468], it was held that the Act of 1922 which 
required every parent. guardian, etc. of a child between 8 
and 16 years to send him "to a public school for the period 
of time a public school shall be held during the current year" 
''. . . unreasonably interferes with the liberty of parents and 
guardians to direct the upbringing and education of children 
under their control. As often heretofore pointed out, rights 
guaranteed by the Constitution may not be abridged by legis-
lation which has no reasonable relation to some purpose 
within the competency of the State. The fundamental theory 
of liberty upon which all governments in this Union repose 
excludes any general power of the State to standardize its 
children by forcing them to aceept instruction from public 
teachers only. The child is not the mere creature of the 
State; those who nurture him and direct his destiny have 
the right, coupled with the high dutr. to recognize and prepare 
him for additional obligations." Respondents Reek to dis-
tinguish the Pierce case on the gronnd tlJat it involved an 
established business conducted for a substantial profit which 
would be destroyed had the act in question been enforced; 
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and on the ground that the Oregon statute sought to keep 
private schools out of the entire State of Oregon. It is 
argued that here in the event the ordinance is enforced, 
Piedmont parents will continue to send their children to 
those private schools which are in existence outside the city 
limits of Piedmont. Respondents' argument is based on the 
theory that in the Pierce case it was considered unreasonable 
to expect Oregon parents to send their children out of the 
state to attend private schools while it is not unreasonable 
to expect PiedmonJ parents to send their children to private 
schools outside the city limits. This begs the question. 
[3] Parents have the right to send their children to private 
schools, rather than public ones, which are located in their 
immediate locality or general neighborhood. It is also argued 
by the city that even the constitutional right of parents to 
educate their children as they choose (Pierce v. Society of 
Sisters, supra, 268 U.S. 510) must yield to a reasonable exer-
cise of the police power. This argument adds nothing to the 
ones heretofore made. The question of the reasonableness of 
the ordinance is the primary one involved here. 
In Yokley, Zoning Law and Practice (2d eel.), volume 1, 
section 57, at page 89, it is said : "In the light of a well known 
Illinois decision [Catholic Bishop of Chicago v. Kinget·y, 371 
Ill. 257 (20 N.E.2d 583)] affecting discrimination between 
classes of schools permitted in certain zones, it is well to 
again state the general principle that a zoning ordinance 
restricting the property rights of an individual without hav-
ing any direct or substantial relationship to the promotion 
of the public health, safety, morals or welfare, is invalid. 
In this case a village zoning ordinance expressly permitting 
the maintenance of public schools but impliedly prohibiting 
private or parochial schools in a residential section was 
declared to be invalid as having no substantial relationship to 
the promotion of the public health, safety, morals or welfare, 
the court holding that the restriction amounted to a capricious 
invasion of property rights. 
''There are many other cases which have been reported 
that uniformly follow this rule that discrimination between 
public and private schools will not be tolerated. . . . '' 
In Mooney v. ViUage of Orchard Lake, 333 Mich. 389 [53 
N.W.2d 308, 310], a suit was brought by the Roman Catholic 
Archbishop to enjoin defendants from enforcing a zoning 
ordinance which prohibited churches and schools in a certain 
residential area. 'rhe court held it would not indulge in a 
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presumption that the ". . . exclusion of school and church 
from an entire municipality is conducive to public health, 
safety, morals or the general welfare, ... A thesis so incon-
sistent with the spirit and genius of our free institutions 
and system of government and the traditions of the American 
people will not be accepted by way of presumption, nor at 
all in the absence of competent evidence establishing a real 
and substantial relationship between the attempted exclusion 
and public health, safety, morals or the general welfare and, 
hence, the reasonableness and validity of the restriction upon 
use of private property as a legitimate exercise of the state's 
police powers.'' In the Mooney case, the facts show that 
there, as here, the zoning ordinance had the practical effect 
of excluding private schools from the entire community. 
In State v. Northwestern Preparatory School, 228 Minn. 
363 [37 N.W.2d 370, 371], it was held that a city zoning 
ordinance permitting public schools in a residential area while 
prohibiting private schools violated the equal protection 
clauses of the federal Constitution and the Minnesota Con-
stitution. It was noted that a private school has "no effect 
upon a residential area different from that of a public or 
parochial one." In Lumpkin v. Township Committee of 
Bernards Tp., 134 N.J.L. 428 [48 A.2d 798], it was held that 
a township zoning ordinance permitting premises in a resi-
dential A zone to be used as a school by a church, but pro-
hibiting use of such premises for a private boarding school 
for boys, was invalid because it bore no substantial relation 
to the public health, morals, safety, or general welfare. It 
was also held that such an ordinance denied the fundamental 
rights guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment to the fed-
eral Constitution. In Concordia Collegiate Institute v. Miller, 
301 N.Y. 189 [93 N.E.2d 632], it was held that an amendment 
to a zoning ordinance which permitted a school in a residential 
district after the petitioner had filed the consents of 80 per 
cent of the owners of property in the district was invalid 
as violative of the due process clauses of the federal and 
state Constitutions. Quoting from N ectow v. City of Cam-
bridge, 277 U.S. 183 [ 48 S.Ct. 447, 72 L.Ed. 842], it was 
held that "The governmental power to interfere by zoning 
regulations with the general rights of the land owner by 
restricting the character of his use, is not unlimited, and 
other questions aside, such restriction cannot be imposed if it 
does not bear a substantial relation to the public health, 
safety, morals, or general welfare." In State v. Joseph, 139 
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, it was held that a zoning 
ordinance churches from a residential district was 
not justified for the protection of public health and safety 
by preventing increased noise, confusion, traffic congestion 
and parking difficulties, or because of the adverse effect on 
values of adjacent or for the protection of the public 
morals and welfare. It was held not a proper governmental 
function to exclude churches from a residential district of a 
municipality in the name of the public for the purpose of 
securing benefits of exclusive residential restrictions to adja-
cent landowners. In State ex r~l. Roman Catholic Bishop of 
Reno v. Hill, 59 Nev. 231 [90 P.2d 217], it was held that a 
zoning ordinance requiring the written permission of 75 per 
cent of the property owners before a church could be erected 
in a residential district was void as violative of the due process 
clauses of the state and federal Constitutions. 
Respondents contend that the cases from other jurisdictions 
are distinguishable from the one under consideration, and 
that in many of the sister states the Supreme Courts are as 
"anti-zoning as the record of this Court is pro-zoning." 
[ 4a] While on the facts, many of the cases may be distin-
guishable, the reasoning which leads to the conclusion that 
an ordinance is invalid which excludes private schools from 
an area in which public schools are found is persuasive. It 
is difficult to make an argument that private schools are 
inimical to the public welfare while public schools are not. 
Respondents argue that Piedmont can neither "allow nor 
refuse to allow'' public schools in Zone A in that only the 
board of education, an agency of the state, has that power. 
It is conceded that the wording of the ordinance purports 
to permit public schools in the area but that the reality of 
the situation is that Piedmont would l1ave no power to exclude 
such schools. The question is not here involved whether the 
city could enact rPasonable legislation concerning public 
schools. In B1dtcrworth v. Boyd, 12 CaL2d 140, 152 [82 
P .2d 434, J 26 A.L.R. 838], it was held that "The school 
system has been held to be a matter of general concern, rather 
than a municipal affair, and consequently is not committed 
to the exclusive control of local governments. But the cities 
may make local regulations beneficial to and in furtherance 
of the school system, provided that these provisions do not 
conflict with the general law. (Whitmore v. Brown, 207 
CaL 473 [279 P. 447] ; Esberg v. Badaracco, 202 Cal. 110 
[259 P. 730] ; Anderson v. Board of Education, 126 Cal.App. 
Oct. 1955] RoMAN CATH. ETC. CoRP. v. CITY OF PmDMONT 3:33 
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514 P.2d 744, 16 P.2d 272].)" A comprehensive zoning 
ordinance of the city of Los Angeles was held proper where 
it involved to some extent a part of the public school system 
(Ransom v. Los Angeles City High Sch. Dist., 129 Cal.App. 
2d 500 [277 P.2d 455] ). Whether a city could zone to exclude 
public schools is not before us now, nor has it been beforr 
a court of this state so far as can be ascertained. The only 
question before us is whether a may, constitutionally, 
by legislation exclude all private schools from 98.7 per cent 
of its total area-which, when the character of the remaining 
area is taken into consideration, constitutes an effective 
exclusion of private schools from thr entire city. 
[5] Respondents argue that a private school will be free 
from any control as distinguished from the control exercised 
over public schools. This argument is without merit. The 
Education Code provides in part ( § 16624) that "Such school 
[private] shall be taught in thr English language and shall 
offer instruction in the several branches of study required 
to be taught in the public sehools of the State. The attendanee 
of the pupils shall be kept by private school authorities in 
a register, and the record of attendanee shall indicate dearly 
every absence of the pupil from sehool for a half day or more 
during each day that school is maintained during the year" 
Insofar as other regulations in the interest of the public 
welfare are concerned, no doubt the city, aeting under its 
poliee power, could insure the pn'servation of the public 
peace and the preservation of private property. 
It is also argued by respondents that the owner of a private 
school may, if the ordinance is struek down, loeate the sehool 
as dictated by its own welfare and interrsts w·ithout any 
control on the part of the city. 'l'his question is not before 
us. Each case must be decided on its faets, and before us 
we have only the question of a private school to be loeated 
adjacent to a Catholic ehureh in the area where public sehools 
are found. [ 4b] Respondents' argument that a private 
sehool located in the precise location involved here would be 
inimieal to the public welfare is not convincing Respondents 
point to no exceptional circumstances concerning the par-
ticular location of this partieular school. The state's basie 
zoning statute provides that a city "may by ordinanee regu-
late, restrict and segregate the location of ... the several 
classes of public and semi-public buildings, and the loeation 
of buildings or property designed for sp.?ci:fied uses. . . . '' 
(Deering's Gen. Laws, 194:3, Act 994, § 2) Artiele XI, sec-
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tion 11, California Constitution, also provides that "Any 
county, city, town or township may make and enforce within 
its limits all such local, police, sanitary, and other regula-
tions as arc not in conflict with general laws.'' 
Respondents place reliance upon the case of Corporat,ion of 
Presiding Bishop v. City of Porterville, 90 Cal.App.2d 656 
[208 P.2d 828]. in \7hich it ;vas held that by ordinance tlw 
city could prohibit all churches in a residential area. That 
case is distinguishable from the one under consid<'ration. 
Here, only private schools are exeludrd--not all schools as 
were all ehnrches in the Pvrterville ea:~e. [G] It is wrll 
~ettled that "no law within the broad areas of state interest 
may be unreasonably d iser ir,;inatory or arbitrary. 'l'he state's 
interest in public education, for example, does not empower 
the Legislature to compel school children to receive instruc-
tion from public teachers only, for it wonld thereby take 
away the right of parents to direct the npbringinL~ and educa-
tion of children under their control." (Pierce v. Society of 
Sisters, supra, 268 U.S. 510, 584, 585.) 
Careful examination of the arguments in support of the 
legislation in question reveals that thrre is absent the com-
pelling justification which would be needed to sustain dis-
crimination of the naturr here involved. 
For the reasons above stated it would appear that the 
ordinance here involved i:;; unconstitutional and void brcause 
of its arbitrary and unreasonable discrimination against 
private schools. 
Let the peremptory writ of mandate issue as prayed. 
Gibson, C. J., Shenk, J., and Traynor, J., concurred. 
SCHAUER, J ., Dissenting.-Hegardless of how beneficial 
and desirable we personally may think this partieular school 
would be, it is our duty to uniformly apply the law and not, 
in order to obtain a result here, set a precedent which will 
have the effect of generally opening- residential areas in all 
cities to private schools. Tt is particularly important that 
we carefully consider and apply the law here because this 
case appears to be de:,igned as a test case to set the pattern 
for other communities. The attack is directly upon the 
classification as between public schools and private schools, 
and the impaet of the ordinance upon petitioner's "business 
and property." 'rhr TJE'tition for the writ is complc>tely silent 
upon whether the ordinance docs or does not provide for 
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variances o1· noncou£onmug uses or exceptions, or for admin-
istrative procedures in respect thereto, or whether any effort 
bas been made to secure an amendment or exception or other 
relief.! 
The only real iossues in this case are two: (1) The ordi-
nance elassifies schools, for purposes of zoning, as those which 
are ''under the jurisdiction of the Board of Education of 
the City of Piedmont,'' and those which are not so governed. 
Is this classification unconstitutional? 
) The petitioner attacks the application of the ordinance 
to its "business and property," with the charge that "Unless 
respondents are compelled ... to issue to petitioner the 
permit which it has requested, and thus authorize the peti-
tioner to construct, erect and establish its proposed school, 
p~titioner 's business and property will suffer irreparable 
injury.'' Does petitioner sustain this attack 1 
Classification 
Classifying as between public and private ownership or 
management of a service or business is not new. It is elemen-
tary that the conduct of a public school is a public service 
while the operation of a private school is a private business. 
The Constitution of California provides in article IX for 
public schools (see also art. XIII, § 15), and in section 15 
of ar·ticle XVI declares among other things that the public 
school system is ''a matter of general concern inasmuch as 
the rducation of the children of the State is an obligation 
and function of the State.'' 
General principles applicable to the classification inherent 
in zoning ordinances are that: "[A] zoning ordinance 
enacted pursuant to a comprehensive plan of community 
development, 'when reasonable in object and not arbitrary in 
operation,' will be sustained as a proper exercise of the police 
power; every intendment is in favor of its validity, and a 
court will not, 'except in a clear case of oppressive and 
arbitrary limitation,' interfere with the legislative discretion; 
1The general rule is that "A party aggrieved by the application of 
a statute or ordinance must invoke and exhaust the administrative 
remedies provided thereby before he may resort to the courts for 
relief. l Citations.}" (Metcalf v. County of Los Angeles (1944), 24 
CaL2d 267, 26fl [148 P.2d 645]; see also Essick v. City of Los Angeles 
(1950), 34 CaU~d 614, 622~623 r213 P.2d 492]; Lockard v. City of Los 
Angeles (1949), 33 Cal.2d 4ii3, 4:37 r202 P.2d 38, 7 A.L.R.2d 990]; 
Bcrnstdn v. SmutZ' (1()47), 83 Cai.App.2d 108, 114~11!1 [188 P.2d 48]; 
City of San Mateo v. Hardy (1944), 64 Cal.App.2d 794, 797 [149 
P.2d 307].) 
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it is to of t!IP public health, 
safety, morals and welfare; and though the court may 
differ with dw authorities as to the 'necessity or pro-
, of the rr;gulatiou, so long as it remains a 'que,tion 
upon which reasonablr minds might differ,' there will be 
no jwlieial int~:rf('retltt> with th(' municipality's determination 
of policy.,. v. of Manhattan Bench (1953), 
41 Cal.2d SR5-88G I 264 P.2d 932 j ; Clemons v. City of 
Los ( 19:10). :)6 Cal.2d 9il, 98-99 f222 P.2d 4391 : see 
also "zoning." 12 CaLTur. 10-Yr.Supp. pp. 166-168. § 25. 
and eas<>s ther(c citec!.) "[T]hc establishment, as part of a 
compreh\'Hsive and systt>matic [zoning] plan, of districts de-
voted to strictly private residt>ncc>s or single family dwt>llings, 
from which are excluded business or mnltiplt> dwelling struc-
tures, is a legitimatt> exercisP of the police power. [ Cita-
tions.]" (Wilkins v City San Bernardino (1946), 29 
Cal.2d 332, 837-838 [171 P.2d 542]; see also Miller v. Board 
of Public Works (1925). 195 Cal. 477, 490-491 [234 P. 371]; 
Cm·poration of Presiding Bishop v. City of Porterville (1949), 
90 CaLApp.2d 65G. 659 r208 P.2d 823].) 
It appears clear that the classification-as between private 
and pub! ic schools---attacked b_v petitiont>r in the ordinance 
here involved has not be('n shown to bt> such that reasonable 
minds may not c!iffer conc-erning it. The city of Piedmont, 
a small city with a total area of approximately 1152 acres 
and a population of less than 12,000. is an "island" entirely 
surrounded by the city of Oakland. In 1929 a comprehensive 
zoning ordinanct> was adopted, dividing- the city into four 
zones designated as Zones A. B, C. and D, rrspeetively. As 
amended in 1936, but prior to the time petitioner acquired 
its property here involv('d, section 3 of the ordinance provides 
that "No building ... shall bt> erected ... in Zone 'A', 
whic-h is . . intended to be occupied or used for any purpose 
other than a single family dwelling. church, or public school 
under the jurisdiction of the Board of Education of the City 
of Piedmont ... '' The zoning provision which thus bans 
private schools from the single family residential Zone A, 
was approved by a vote ( 3,408 to 1,285) of the electors of 
the city. Zone A embraces approximately 1137.14 acres. 
including the land here involved upon which petitioner desires 
to construct and operate a private school. Such schools are 
permitted in the other three zones. 
As establishing pt>titioner 's failure to show invalidity of 
the ordinance, it may be pointed out m the first place that 
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although the majority opinion declares that the only question 
involved in this controversy is "\Vhether the city of Piedmonl 
may, by [a comprehensive zoning] ordinance, constitutionally 
prevent the constrnclion of a building to be used for private 
school purposes in an area [a si:r..gle family residential zone) 
where public scllools are located,'' it appears to be conceded 
petitioner for the writ that the city does not have power 
or the legal right to exclude public schools, which are nndPr 
the jurisdiction of the board of education, from its single 
family residential Zone A, which is here involved. (See 
Cal. Const., art. IX; sec also Butterworth v. Boyrl ( 1938), 
12 Cal.2d 140, 152 [82 P.2d 434, 126 A.L.R. 838] : Gerth v. 
Dorn.inguez (1934), 1 Cal.2d 239, 242 [84 P.2d 135]: Ward v. 
San Diego Sch. Dist. (1928), 203 Cal. 712. 715-717 [265 P. 
821]; Esber·g v. Badaraeco (1927), 202 Cal. llO, ll5-119 [259 
P. 730] .) A public school district has the power of eminent do-
main and may be allowed, by condemnation, in a prop<'r cas(~, 
to acquire property for a school site. (See e.g., Long Beach 
City H. S. Dist. v. Stewart ( 1947), 30 Cal.2d 763 [ 185 P.2d 
585, 173 A.L. R. 249] ; State ex rel. B1·itton v. Mttlloy ( 1933), 
332 :Mo. 1107 [61 S.W.2d 741].) It follows that, as contended 
by the city, if it is without power to exclude public schools 
from Zone A, then its zoning ordinance which excludes privatc> 
but not public schools from that zone cannot fairly be held 
to invalidly discriminate against private and in favor of 
public schools. The general dassification as between public 
schools and private schools is set up by the Constitution 
itself. 2 'l'hus it seems indisputable that the classification here 
involved is not, as such, vulnerable to petitioner's attack. 
'See Constitution of California, article IX: "Sec. 5. 'rhe Legis-
lature shall proYide for a system of common schools by which a free 
school shall be kept up and supported in each district at least six 
months in every year, after the first year in whic.h a school has been 
established. 
''Sec. 6 .... 'l'he Public School System shall include all kindergarten 
schools, elementary schools, secondary schools, technie.al schools, and 
state colleges, established in accordance with law and, in addition, 
the school districts and the other agencies authorized to maintain 
them. No school or college or any other part of the Public School 
System shall be, directly or indirectly, transferred from the Public 
School System or placed under the jurisdiction of any authority other 
than one included within the Public School System .... 
"Sec. 8. No public money shall ever be appropriated for the support 
of any sectarian or denominational school, or any school not under 
the exclusive control of the officers of the public schools; nor shall 
any sectarian or denominational doctrine be taught, or instruction 
thereon be permitted, directly or indirectly, in any of the common 
schools of this State." 
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Turning now to thr application of the ordinance under the 
circumstances of the case and as affecting 's "busi-
ness and property," the following defects in its ease appear: 
It has not been established as a fact that there are no adequate 
arras in which private schools may be built which would be 
accessible to residents (either children or adults) 
of Piedmont. As alrrady stated, Piedmont, a 
small city, is entirely surrounded by the of Oakland. 
and. further, petitioner's property is actually bounded on 
one side by a bonlevard which is entirely within Oakland. 
'flms, not only has it been here shown that there arc 
matdy 15 acres of land within Piedmont which are outside 
residential Zone A and upon which private schools are per· 
mitted under the zoning ordinance, but it has not been show!"! 
that there is no available and reasonably accessible land 
within the surrounding city of Oakland npon which private 
schools are permitted. It seems obvious, therefore, that peti-
tioner has failed to establi~h either that it is being oppressively 
and arbitrarily prevented from operating a private school 
catering to residents of Piedmont, or that Piedmont residents 
are being prevented from attending private schools; those 
wishing to attend, or to send their children to, private schools 
may, so far as appears, utilize such schools in Oakland or 
elsewhere in the San Francisco Bay area as it may be pre-
sumed they have done in the past. Furthermore, there is a 
complete absence of showing of an attempt by the city of 
Piedmont or by any other governmental unit to compel 
attendance at public schools only, or to take away the rigl1t 
of any parents to direct the upbringing or edueation of 
children under their control. Whether or not any particular 
property owner is or is not permitted to carry out his desires 
for future> development of his particular property into a 
private school obviously has no bearing upon the rights of 
either adults or children to attend private schools. (See 
Corporation of Presidmg Bishop v. City of Portervnzc ( 1949), 
supra, 90 Cal.App.2d 656, 660.) 
In the next place, Piedmont, under the terms of its free-
holders' charter, is ''primarily a residential city,'' and has 
been recognized as such by tbis court. (Reynolds v. Barrett 
(1938), 12 Cal.2d 244. 246, 249 [83 P.2d 29].) It is stipu-
lated that petitioner's projected school would not be under 
the jurisdiction of the Board of Education of the city of 
Piedmont, but would be "owned and operated by petitioner" 
and would be constructed and operated next door to land on 
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a Roman Catholic and a rectory occupied 
of said Chureh ·who serve Corpus Christi Parish 
in the Archdiocese of San Francisco of such Church." Thus 
it is indicated the proposed private school would draw pupils 
not only from Piedmont but from surrounding San ~'rancisco 
Bay area communities, whereas, only Piedmont 
children attend public schools located in that If the 
is compelled to permit petitionrr 's contemplated private 
then it would seem that it will be compelled 
to permit other private schools in its single family residential 
zone. 'l'hat is, it must permit all private schools to enter 
unless this court is prepared to examine and censor 
or itself prescribe the projected curriculum, or other basis 
of elassification, of each private school which proposes to 
construct a building and playground and commence business 
in Piedmont's Zone A. It is elerrwntary that '' 'fhe power 
of the legislature to impose restrictions on a lawful calling 
must b'~ exercised in conformity with the constitutional re-
quirement that such restrictions must operate equally upon 
all persons pursuing the same business or profession under 
the same circumstances .... Hence, if a statute allows one 
class of persons to engage in what is presumptively a legiti-
mate business while denying such right to others, it must 
be based upon some principle which may reasonably promote 
the public health, safety, or welfare." (11 Am.Jur. 1046-
1047, § 285.) This court cannot in good conscience create a 
classification which it could not sustain if created by the 
Legislature. 
A list provided by property owners opposing petitioner 
in this proceeding, of the various private schools taken from 
the classified section of the San Francisco Bay area telephone 
directories shows at least 176 private schools, including among 
others, schools affiliated with various religious groups/; driving 
"Among the names listed are: Baptist Divinity School, Holy Names 
School, Our Lady of Perpetual Help School, :M:t. St. Joseph's School, 
Hcdecmer Lutheran School, Seventh Day Adventist School, West 
Portal Lutheran School, Zion Lutheran Church and School, St. Anne's 
School, St. Anthony's School, St. Augustine's School, St. Boniface 
School, St. Brigid School, St. Charles School, St. Dominic's School, 
St. Elizabeth's School, St. Emydius School, St. GabTiel School, St. 
Ignatius High School, St .. James Boys School, St. John Lutheran 
School, St. Mary's Chinese Day School, St. Mary's Chinese Language 
School, St. Paul's Grammar School, St. Paul's High School, St. Philip's 
School, St. Stephens School, St. Vincent de Paul School, St. Vincent's 
High School, St. Columba School, St. John's School, St .. Joseph High 
School, St. Joseph's Grammar School, St. Lawrence 0'1'oole School, 
and St. Mary's School. 
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schools, language schools, astrology schools, bartending schools, 
real estate schools, divinity schools, nursery schools, furniture 
finishing schools, radio schools, labor schools, beauty culture 
schools, mechanical arts schools, Swedish massage schools, sec-
retarial schools, television schools, success schools, engineering 
schools, fencing schools, dancing schools, sewing schools, charm 
schools, dramatic schools, and finishing schools-to name but 
a few. Presumptively each of such private schools operates 
lawfully and furnishes instruction which to substantial seg-
ments of the population has some special value and desirability 
over and above instrurtion furnished in public schools. Some 
or all of the subjects taught in public schools could, of course, 
be included in the curriculum of the private schools, if the 
court deems that important as a basis for classification. 
If the city of Piedmont is obliged by this court to permit 
petitioner to devote its property to private school purposes, 
in violation of the city's zoning ordinance, then the conclusion 
appears indubitably to follow that the city's doors must like-
wise be opened, upon demand of any other interested property 
owner, to any or all other private schools which in the manner 
of their operation are no more obnoxious to the public peace 
or quiet, or inherently unlawful, than the school herein author-
iz<'d, all to the substantial, if not utter, subversion of the 
planned residential character of Zone A. Zoning ordinances 
permitting parochial or church schools but prohibiting other 
private schools in residential districts haYe been held arbi-
trary, capricious, and invalid in State v. Northwestern Pre-
paratory School (1949), 228 Minn. 363 [37 N.W.2d 370, 371), 
and Lumplc1:n v. Townsluip Committee of Bernar'ds Tp. ( 1946), 
134 N.J .L. 428 [ 48 A.2d 798]. Certainly this court cannot 
discriminate either in favor of, or against, a private school 
because of a religious affiliation or sponsorship, nor can this 
conrt properly undertake to censor or prescribe the curriculum 
of any lawfully conducted school, whether public or private. 
Freedom in the field of education is one of the basically 
protected rights (Pierce v. Society of Sisters (1925), 268 
H.S. 510. 535 [ 45 S.Ct. 571, 573, 69 L.Ed. 1070, 39 A.L.R. 
468]; lJJ:eyer v. State of Nebraska (1923), 262 U.S. 390 [43 
f1Ct. 625, 67 L.Ed. 1042, 29 A.L.R. 1446]), but this does 
not mean that a private school is, as to location, immune 
from the application of comprehensive zoning ordinances. 
The majority opinion states, but does not attempt to answer, 
the cogent factors which may have moved the city council 
and the electors to approve the exclusion of private schools 
Oct. 195G] RoMAN OATIL ETC. CoRP. v. CITY OF PIEDMONT 341 
[45 C.2d 325; 289 P.2d 438] 
from the residential zone. The very statement of such factors 
-the character of the district, the relativity of its surround-
ings, its school age population, the availability of other prop-
erty, the conservation of property values, matters affecting 
traffic control, size of streets, parking, noise, fire protection, 
overburdening of water mains and sewers, and the peace, 
comfort and quiet of the district for residential purposes-
demonstrates that reasonable minds might differ as to the 
necessity or propriety of the regulation, and that therefore 
there should be no judicial interference with the munici-
pality's determination. That such factors are legitimate con-
siderations in the establishment and maintenance of residen-
tial districts is not open to dispute, under the zoning principles 
established in this state. (See Gov. Code, § 38695, formerly 
Deering's Gen. Laws, Act 994, § 2; Miller v. Board of Public 
Works ( 1925), supra, 195 Cal. 477, 492-494; Corporation of 
Presiding Bishop v. City of Porterville (1949), supra, 90 
Cal.App.2d 656, 659-661.) 
Surely the inherent differences between public schools on 
the one hand and those privately operated on the other 
furnishes clear support for the application by the munici-
pality of the factors enumerated above. For one thing, there 
are many more private than public schools; many are operated 
under religious and many under secular domination and the 
manner of their operation may be as varied as the subjects 
they teach. In State v. Sinar (1954), 267 Wis. 91 [65 N.W.2d 
43, 47], the court in upholding an ordinance which permitted 
public schools and private elementary schools in a residential 
zone but excluded private high schools, pointed out that 
although public and private schools may perform like func-
tions in some respects, nevertheless the public school serves 
the surrounding area without discrimination, whereas the 
private school, whether or not sectarian, does not. "The 
private school imposes on the community all the disadvan-
tages of the public school but does not compt:nsate the com-
munity in the same manner or to the same extent. If the 
private school does not make the same contribution to public 
welfare this difference may be taken into consideration by 
the legislative body in framing its ordinance." (P. 47 of 
65 NW.2d.) Further, it appears that the elected Board 
of Education of the city of Piedmont, which is directly re-
sponsive to the people, is required to consult and advise with 
"the planning commission having jurisdiction of" property 
proposed to be acquired for new public school sites. See 
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Ed. Code, § 18403.) Standards for su;:;h sites are established 
the State Department of Edueation. § 18402.) No 
such control can be exercised by the city over ihe location 
of private schools, if it is compelled to petitioner the 
building permit here sought. another ground is shown 
for the reasonable exercise of its 
to determine policy, and one upon which a 
reasonable mind eould say the regulation h<:re in eontroycrsy 
is at least fairly debatable-and therefore not to be judicially 
overthrown. 
Irreparable Injury to Petitioner's 
Business and Property 
The record shows that petitioner acquired the land con-
cerned in July, 1954-some 18 years after4 the anwndmcnt 
of the zoning ordinance to ban priyatc sehools from Zone A ; 
the last prior owner of the lal1(1 was 'l'he Homan Catholic 
Archbishop of San Francisco, a California corporation sole. 
The same corporation sole owns additional, adjoining, land 
on which "are a Roman Catholic Church, and a rectory occu-
pied by priests of said Church who serve Corpus Christi 
Parish in the Archdiocese of San Francisco of such Church." 
The school building which petitioner seeks to construct would 
have dimensions of 204 feet by 65 feet and an area of 13,260 
square feet; .in addition petitioner's land has an area of some 
16,240 square feet "which is available for incidental andjor 
school playground uses.'' 
Petitioner's land along its east boundary fronts upon the 
west side of Park Boulevard, all of which boulcvard in that 
area lies within the corporate limits of the city of Oakland 
and not within the city of Piedmont. Adjacent to petitioner's 
land is a "residential area known as 'St. James ·wood,' which 
comprise;;; approximately 227 building sites, all of which are 
restricted, by restrictions of record, to single family resi-
dences; the owners of said property have formed and are 
members of an association known as 'St. ,James Wood Homes 
Association.' If a witness were called for city of Piedmont 
he would testify that at a meeting of the members of said 
Association, held ,J nne 15, 19G4, said members voted ( 170 to 
2) objection to the granting of a permit for the building of 
petitioner's proposed school." 
It thus is shown that petitioner's land was acquired by 
•see Village of Euclid v. Amb?er Realty Co. (1926), 272 U.S. 365 
[47 S.Ot. 114, 71 L.Ed. 303, .54 A.L.R. 1016]; Jones v. City of Los 
Angeles (1930), 211 Cal. 304, 318-321 [295 P. 14.]. 
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advance that such land lies in a single 
residential zone, and, furthrr, that the adjacent land 
within the of Piedmont is used for single family resi-
dential, rather than for private business, purposes. Under 
such circumstances no support is found for petitioner's as-
sertion of ''irreparable '' to its business and property 
if it does not sectue the school building permit it 
seeks. 
In Wilkins v. C·ity of San Bernardino ( 1946), supra, 29 
Cal.2d 332. 340, this court said that ''An examination of the 
California decisions discloses that the eases in which zoning 
ordinances have been held invalid and unr<~asonable as ap-
plied to particular property fall roughly into four categories: 
1. Where the zoning ordinance attempts to exclude and pro-
hibit existing and established uses or businesses that are 
not nuisances. [Citations.] 2. Vlhere the restrictions create 
a monopoly. [Citations.] 3. Where the use of adjacent prop-
erty renders the land entirely unsuited to or unusable for 
the only pt:.rpose permitted by the ordinance. [Citation.] 
4. \Vhere a small parcel is restricted and given less rights than 
the surrounding property, as where a lot in the center of a 
business or commercial district is limited to use for resi-
dential purposes, thereby creating an 'island' in the middle 
of a larger area devoted to other uses. [Citations.] '' 
Petitioner has alleged no facts showing, and makes no 
effort to support a elaim, that the present case falls into 
any of the categories above listed, but merely alleges generally 
that "Unless respondents are compelled ... to issue to 
petitioner the permit which it has requested and, thus author-
ize the petitioner to construct, erect and establish its pro-
posed school, petitioner's business and property will suffer 
irreparable injury." The law is settled, however, that "The 
mere fact that. some hardship may be experienced is not 
material, for ' [ e] very exercise of the police power is apt 
to affect adversely the property interest of somebody.' " 
(Clemons v. City of Los Angeles (1950), supra, 36 Cal.2d 
95, 99; Zahn v. Board of Pttblic Works (1925), 195 Cal. 497, 
503 [234 P. 388].) "\Vhere it is claimed that the ordinance 
is unreasonable as applied to plaintiff's property, or that 
a change in conditions has rendered application of the ordi-
nance unreasonable, it is incumbent on plaintiff to produce 
sufficient evidence from which the court can make such find-
ings as to the physical facts involved as will justify it in 
concluding, as a matter of law, that the ordinance is un-
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reasonable and invalid. It is not sufficient for him to show 
that it will be more profitable to him to make other use of his 
property, or that such other use will not cause injury to the 
public, but he must show an abuse of discretion on the part 
of the zoning authorities and that there has been an un-
reasonable and unwarranted exercise of the police power. 
[Citation.]" (Wilkins v. City of San Bernardino (1946). 
supra, 29 Cal.2d 332, 338.) " [I] t must be shown that there 
has been an unreasonable, oppressive, or unwarranted inter-
ference with property rights in the exercise of the police 
power before a zoning ordinance can be held invalid [ cita-
tions] ... The burden rests upon the plaintiff to establish 
the invalidity of the ordinance and its application to the 
property involved. The plaintifi"s failure to sustain this 
burden raises a presumption of the existence of sueh faets as 
are sufficient to sustain the ordinance. [Citation.] " (Be t•erly 
Oil Co. v. City of Los Angeles (1953), 40 Cal.2d 552, 559 
[254 P.2d 865].) 
If we conform to the principles above stated the writ sought 
should be denied. 
Edmonds, J., and Spence, J., concurred. 
Respondents' petition for a rehearing was denied Novem-
ber 23, 1955. Edmonds, J., Schauer, J., and Spence, J., were 
of the opinion that the petition should be granted. 
